















































































































































































































































































































































































Validation 4.0 2.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 2.0 1.5
Expertise 1.0 3.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
Funding 1.0 1.5 4.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 1.5 0.0
Lobbying 0.5 0.0 1.0 4.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0
Control	of	flow 0.0 1.5 1.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 1.5
Self	funding 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.5 4.0 2.0 0.5 0.5 0.0
River
management
2.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.0
Add.	funding
CR
0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.5 0.0
Add.	funding
DR
0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 3.0 0.0
















































































































DDT 0.6 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
ONEMA 0.05 0.6 0.15 -0.05 0.05 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
AEAG 0.05 0.1 0.7 -0.05 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Riparian	Farmers 0.05 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.2 -0.1 0.05 0.0 0.0 0.0
Upstream	towns 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.7 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Downstream	towns 0.1 0.15 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.05
SIAH 0.1 0.0 0.05 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.65 0.0 0.0 0.0
Regional	Council 0.0 0.05 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.05 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.0
Departmental	Council 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.0






































































































































































































































































































































































































Validation 9.98 0.1 1.6
Expertise 4.7 4.0 1.7
Funding 6.79 1.5 1.1
Lobbying 9.33 0.6 0.7
Control	of	flow 7.7 0.5 3.0
Self	funding 6.36 1.6 4.0
River	management 4.94 1.1 2.5
Add.	funding	CR 6.53 1.6 2.1
Add.	funding	DR 6.66 1.5 1.3

































DDT 18.8 2.5 8.6 4.3 3.9 -0.6 14.7 1.8 3.3 -0.3 57.0 94.0%
ONEMA 11.9 12.0 19.2 -1.5 -6.1 2.0 14.6 0.9 1.0 0.1 54.1 84.6%
AEAG 8.6 3.3 33.7 0.2 -8.9 2.7 17.1 3.6 3.8 0.1 64.2 86.8%
Riparian
Farmers
4.1 0.1 2.9 33.3 19.1 -14.3 12.2 0.1 0.3 -2.3 55.7 82.6%
Upstream
towns
6.6 0.5 1.8 15.2 33.2 -17.1 11.0 0.5 1.0 -2.7 49.9 81.6%
Downstream
towns
7.0 3.7 14.5 -11.2 -24.8 31.3 9.7 1.8 2.0 2.8 36.8 60.5%
SIAH 6.6 0.3 15.6 1.8 0.1 9.7 21.4 0.5 0.8 0.2 57.0 89.6%
Regional
Council
6.8 1.7 14.4 0.3 -2.7 4.0 11.1 15.0 2.9 0.1 53.6 93.1%
Departmental
Council
10.7 2.4 12.8 0.4 -2.9 -0.4 13.1 4.4 13.8 0.0 54.2 89.2%
Engineering
Firm
13.6 2.2 11.3 -5.0 -7.3 3.9 16.0 0.8 0.8 11.6 47.8 76.3%
Power 94.7 28.6 134.8 73.0 109.0 86.2 141.0 29.4 29.5 20.2
Coop.	power 94.7 28.6 134.8 55.4 56.4 53.7 141.0 29.4 29.5 14.9
Table	8.	In	columns,	the	configurations	corresponding	to	the	maximum	and	the	minimum	satisfaction	of	each	actor	and	of	the	whole	organization
(i.e.	the	sum	of	actors'	satisfactions);	in	the	rows,	the	state	of	relations	and	the	satisfactions	of	actors.
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Interpretation	of	results
8.5 The	analysis	of	the	simulation	results	allows	us	to	examine,	in	terms	of	power	relationships,	the	hypotheses	about	the	action	system	of	basin
Touch	derived	from	the	results	gained	by	the	Actor-Network	and	Territorial	Public	Interest	theories	(Cf.	2.15).	The	first	three	hypotheses	are
clearly	confirmed,	while	the	fourth	is	not.	The	convergence	state	is	interpreted	as	a	regularized	configuration	and,	on	the	whole,	it	matches
the	one	observed	by	the	field	investigation[18].
8.6 Hypothesis	1:	To	be	the	"obligatory	passage	point"	of	the	Actor-Network,	is	that	SIAH	has	enough	power	to	somehow	constrain	other	actors?
The	results	in	table	7	show	that	SIAH	is	the	actor	having	the	highest	level	of	power	(141)	at	the	convergence	configuration,	with	a	significant
gap	-	except	with	AEAG	(the	Water	Agency).	Moreover,	this	high	level	of	power	is	purely	cooperative:	SIAH	is	in	conflict	with	no	actor	in	the
system.	SIAH	is	the	one	who	gives	others	the	more	capability	for	action.	It	therefore	appears	to	be	the	"obligatory	passage	point"	for	the
proper	functioning	of	the	system,	since	he	is	the	one	who	gives	them	the	means	to	cooperate.	Another	element,	structural,	tends	to	confirm
this	central	position	of	SIAH:	the	configurations	that	maximize	and	minimize	the	system's	whole	satisfaction,	i.e.	the	sum	of	all	actors'
satisfactions	(see	table	8).	The	configuration	that	provides	SIAH	with	the	highest	satisfaction	(71)	is	very	close	to	the	one	that	maximizes	the
system's	whole	satisfaction	(579).	In	other	words,	the	more	SIAH	has	the	means	to	achieve	his	goals,	the	more	all	actors	do.	The	same	holds
in	the	opposite:	the	configuration	that	minimizes	the	SIAH's	satisfaction	(-62)	also	minimizes	the	system's	whole	satisfaction	(-347).	The	SIAH
appears	as	embodying	the	"Territorial	public	interest"	of	basin	Touch—the	action	system	works	properly	if	and	only	if	the	SIAH	has	the
means	to	be	active.
8.7 Hypothesis	2:	Purposing	to	play	an	important	role	and	to	introduce	a	change	in	the	management	of	flood	risk,	is	that	SIAH	has	the	means	to
do	so?
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This	is	to	examine	the	state	of	the	relationship	controlled	by	SIAH,	which	is	4.9	in	average.	Recall	that	negative	values	represent	situations
where	SIAH	does	not	act	as	he	wishes	with	respect	to	flood	risk	management.	They	produce	a	negative	capability	for	himself.	In	contrast,
positive	values	are	associated	with	positive	and	increasing	capability	and	reflect	situations	where	SIAH	may	more	and	more	act	in	the	way	he
wants,	that	is	to	say	promote	an	hydromorphology	which	includes	risk	prevention.	Value	4.9	corresponds	to	a	situation	where	SIAH	exerts	his
action	in	the	direction	he	wants	and,	being	an	"obligatory	passage	point",	he	incites	the	whole	system	of	action	to	go	in	this	direction.
However,	not	as	much	as	it	could	be	possible.	He	is	limited	by	the	interplay	of	actors	and	regulatory	constraints,	particularly	because	it	is	the
DDT	which	investigates	and	appraises	cases	of	FRPP	and	continues	to	apply	a	rigid	regulatory	framework	taking	little	account	of	local	actors.
This	limitation	is	the	price	to	pay	for	his	strategy	whose	consensual	nature	is	necessary	for	the	enrolment	of	other	actors.	The	resulting
configuration	of	the	action	system	provides	SIAH	with	a	satisfaction	of	57,	corresponding	to	89	%	of	his	maximum	satisfaction,	which	is	quite
convenient.
8.8 Hypothesis	3:	In	the	enrolment	of	other	actors	on	the	service	of	an	hydromorphological	management	of	the	river,	is	that	SIAH	has	powerful
allies?
One	can	answer	in	the	affirmative:	SIAH	has	a	powerful	ally	in	AEAG.	On	the	one	hand,	AEAG	is	the	most	powerful	actor	after	SIAH	(134.8).
On	the	other	hand,	the	strong	contribution	of	AEAG	to	the	satisfaction	of	SIAH	(15.6),	and,	conversely,	the	important	contribution	of	SIAH	to
the	satisfaction	of	AEAG	(17.1)	demonstrate	the	existence	of	an	alliance	between	the	two	organizations.	Moreover,	the	study	of	correlations
over	the	100	runs	shows	that	the	satisfactions	of	SIAH	and	AEAG	are	highly	correlated	at	0.814.	This	alliance	is	certainly	important	for	SIAH,
since	he	is	funded	by	AEAG.	But	it	is	also	fully	convenient	for	AEAG:	the	high	state	of	the	relation	he	controls	(6.8)	shows	that	he	pursues	the
action	he	wishes;	the	resulting	configuration	provides	him	with	the	highest	level	of	satisfaction	of	the	action	system,	64.2.	Undoubtedly,	AEAG
firmly	contributes	to	the	enrolment	of	others	led	by	SIAH.
8.9 Hypothesis	4:	Is	that	the	agreement	on	the	"	Territorial	Public	Interest	"	is	confirmed	by	the	absence	of	major	conflict	in	the	system	of	action?
The	results	show	the	persistence	of	a	conflict	between	the	upstream	and	downstream	towns.	The	relative	agreement	on	an
hydromorphological	management	of	the	river	fails	to	resolve	the	conflict	between	their	respective	interests.	This	conflict	is	reflected	by	the
negative	contribution	that	the	first	offers	to	the	satisfaction	of	the	seconds	(-24.8)	and	vice	versa	(-17.1).	The	two	types	of	communes	adopt
strategies	that	remain	antagonistic	despite	the	action	of	SIAH.	This	conflict	is	to	the	detriment	of	downstream	towns.	He	is	the	less	satisfied
actor	(36.8)	at	a	level	that	is	significantly	below	average.	He	is	also	the	actor	that	exploits	the	less	his	possibilities	(60.8%)	while	all	others
manage	to	gain	more	than	80%	of	their	maximum	satisfaction.	One	explanation	of	this	failure	could	be	that,	in	fact,	downstream	towns	is	in
structural	conflict	with	the	whole	system	of	action:	table	8	shows	that	his	highest	satisfaction	(110)	is	the	lowest	(among	the	maximum
satisfactions)	for	the	whole	system	(405)	and	his	lowest	satisfaction	(-75)	is	the	highest	for	the	whole	system	(-72).	He	should	change	his
strategy	to	succeeds	in	negotiating	the	value	of	his	financial	support.	However,	the	configuration	corresponding	to	the	maximal	global
satisfaction	shows	that	there	exists	a	compromise,	but	it	is	not	accepted	by	Riparian	farmers	and	upstream	towns,	whose	satisfactions	would
decrease	from	55.7	to	51	and	49.9	to	43	respectively.
Conclusion
9.1 This	paper	does	not	primarily	present	an	agent-based	model	and	simulation	results	about	a	particular	case	or	phenomenon.	According	to	the
taxonomy	of	Boero	and	Squazzoni	(2005:	3),	the	metamodel	presented	in	section	3	and	4	falls	in	the	scope	of	"typification",	that	is	researches
which	"are	intended	to	investigate	some	theoretical	properties"	of	"	a	specific	class	of	empirical	phenomena	that	share	some	idealised
properties	"	and	are	the	object	domain	of	a	social	science	theory.	So,	we	have	presented	a	class	of	models	which	is	defined,	by	intention,	by
the	constitutive	elements	and	relationships	of	these	models,	as	shown	in	table	1.	Staying	at	a	higher	level	of	abstraction	than	the	level	of
particular	models,	it	is	then	possible	to	develop	mathematical	tools,	like	the	ones	introduced	in	section	7,	whose	definition	relies	on	the
common	structure	of	models	and	which	may	be	applied	to	each	model.	These	tools	allow	to	significantly	improve	the	interpretation	of	the
simulation	results	and,	quite	often,	as	for	the	case	studied	in	section	8,	they	bring	a	deeper	explanation	for	the	phenomena	that	emerge	from
simulations.	Moreover,	they	allow	to	compare	results	and	so	to	produce	knowledge	that	are	not	just	restricted	to	a	particular	case	but	are
generalizable	to	the	entire	class	of	models	(Boero	and	Squazzoni	2005).
9.2 The	SocLab	framework	is	a	matter	for	sociology,	not	for	management	sciences.	It	does	not	address	issues	related	to	the	performance	of	an
organization,	its	operational	efficiency	or	effectiveness,	or	the	contingent	relevance	of	its	structure	with	regard	to	its	environment	and	goals.	In
this,	it	differs,	among	many	others,	from	management-oriented	models	such	as	PCANS	(Krackhardt	and	Carley	1998),	ORA	(Carley	et	al.
2011)	and	the	28	models	examined	by	Ashworth	and	Carley	(2007),	from	organization-based	models	for	multi-agents	systems	such	as
MOISE	(Hubner	et	al.	2002;	Gâteau	et	al.	2005),	OPERA	(Dignum	and	Weigand	2003;	Penserini	et	al.	2009),	ISLANDER	(Esteva	et	al.	2001)
and	DEPINT	(Sichman	1998),	or	from	logic-based	models	of	power	relationships	(Castelfranchi	2003;	2011).	All	these	models	reduce	more	or
less	the	members	of	an	organization	to	the	strict	fulfillment	of	roles	assigned	to	them	by	the	rules	of	the	organization.	They	do	not	pay	much
attention	to	the	nature	of	human	beings	which,	as	stressed	by	(Ashworth	and	Carley	2007),	are	the	core	of	organizations	while	their	behaviors
feature	"a	seeming	defiance	of	theoretical	conformity".
9.3 This	framework	just	addresses	the	social	dimension	of	organizations,	assuming	that	it	deserves	to	be	considered	for	itself	and	that	it	is	an
essential	(if	not	the	main)	determinant	of	the	proper	functioning	of	any	organization.	To	this	end,	it	considers	the	instrumental	use	of	roles,
whether	defined	by	the	organization	or	introduced	by	the	actor	who	seizes	it,	which	are	handled	by	actors	as	both	opportunities	and
constraints	for	the	achievement	of	their	own	aims	and	the	recognition	of	themselves	by	others.	So,	SocLab	models	are	focused	on	power
relationships	which	stay	at	the	heart	of	the	dynamics	of	collective	action	systems[19].	This	framework	includes	analytical	tools	enabling	to
objectivize	the	relative	position	of	each	actor	in	the	current	configuration	of	the	organization	and	to	unveil	the	potentialities	of	other	possible
configurations.	Thanks	to	a	model	of	the	social	actor's	rationality,	mostly	interested	by	the	achievement	of	his	aims	but	suffering	from	cognitive
and	awareness	limitations,	the	simulation	enables	to	compute	how	an	organization	could	be	regulated.
9.4 We	have	presented	a	model	of	an	actor	system	concerned	by	the	definition	and	the	implementation	of	the	management	policy	of	a	small	river
in	SW	France.	In	the	context	of	first	an	increase	within	the	whole	society	of	concerns	for	ecological	issues	and	perspectives	and	second	the
socio-economic	problems	raised	by	the	frequent	floods	of	the	river,	the	research	question	for	the	sociologist	is	whether	there	is	an	evolution	in
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the	principles	of	the	river's	management	policy,	who	could	promote	this	evolution	and	whether	there	is	a	shared	agreement	on	these	new
principles.	These	interrogations	led	to	state	four	hypotheses	which	are	translated	into	technical	questions	for	the	model.	To	the	extent	that,	at
the	building	of	the	model,	the	translation	from	the	sociological	analysis	of	the	organization	into	the	SocLab	model	is	well	documented	and
substantiated,	the	findings	resulting	from	the	analysis	of	simulation	results	and	properties	of	the	model	are	easily	translated	back	in	the	terms
of	the	organization	under	consideration.	For	space	limitation,	it	was	not	possible	to	document	the	proposed	SocLab	model,	i.e.	to	document
the	relations	between	the	field	observations	and	the	model	constituents.	However,	we	have	shown	how	to	argue	that	the	first	three
hypotheses	to	be	checked	are	clearly	confirmed,	while	the	fourth	is	not.
9.5 The	main	domain	of	application	of	the	SocLab	framework	could	be	the	assessment	of	the	social	dimension	of	public	policies.	There	is	a
growing	demand	for	regulatory	impact	assessment,	see	e.g.	(European	Commission	2005),	including	the	social	dimension	which,	in	practice,
is	coped	with	great	difficulty.	Indeed,	the	discursive	statement	of	the	results	provided	by	most	sociological	analyses	does	not	feature	the
properties	of	quantitative	scientific	knowledge,	so	that	they	are	difficult	to	compare	and	integrate	with	results	provided	by	economics	and
environmental	sciences.	The	quantitative	results	provided	by	SocLab	makes	this	integration	possible,	as	experienced	in	the	Life	European
project	Concert'Eau	(Adreit	et	al.	2011).
9.6 We	believe	that	this	framework	is	also	relevant	for	integrated	assessment	(Toth	and	Hizsnyik	1998)	and	companion	modeling	processes
(Becu	et	al.	2003),	where	scientists	and/or	stakeholders	have	a	collective	interest	in	establishing	a	shared	representation	of	the	state	of
affairs.	In	this	context,	each	actor	will	have	the	possibility	to	express	his	own	view	in	a	formal	way,	which	includes	no	ambiguity	and	can	be
discussed	by	others;	the	agreed	and	problematic	points	can	be	clearly	identified.	Then,	SocLab	can	be	used	to	shed	light	on	the	causes	of
dysfunctions	and	to	investigate	the	impact	of	new	distributions	of	resources	among	the	actors.	The	SocLab	environment	may	also	be	used	to
undertake	practical	experiments	in	a	teaching	or	theoretical	context	(Roggero	2008).	As	for	well-circumscribed	concrete	organizations,	their
formal	study	entails	an	exposure	of	the	power	relationships,	what	enterprises,	associations	or	institution	do	wish	only	in	specific
circumstances.
Notes
1	http://soclabproject.wordpress.com
2	Morgan	addresses	different	aspects	of	the	organization	through	the	eight	following	images:	organizations	as	organisms,	as	machines,	as
political	systems,	as	psychic	prison,	as	flux	and	transformation,	as	culture,	as	brain	and	as	instruments	of	domination.
3	According	to	SOA,	ZUs	are	grounded	upon:	specific	competence	or	expertise;	the	control	of	interactions	with	the	environment	of	the
organization;	the	control	of	the	internal	communication;	and	the	knowledge	and	proper	use	of	the	organization	formal	rules.
4	The	power	of	an	individual	or	a	group,	a	social	actor,	is	"a	function	of	the	size	of	the	zone	of	uncertainty	that	the	unpredictability	of	the
actor's	conduct	enables	him	to	control	vis-a-vis	his	partners"	(Crozier	and	Friedberg	1980:	34).
5	Literally	"Syndicat	Intercommunal	d'Aménagement	Hydraulique"	of	the	Touch	river.	It	is	entrusted	by	the	State	with	the	maintenance	of	the
river	for	the	sake	of	the	riparian	proprietors,	which	own	the	bank	and	the	bed	of	the	river.	It	is	funded	by	the	Water	Agency.	See
http://www.siah-du-touch.org	for	more	details.
6	Actors	are	endowed	with	a	situated	rationality,	as	Friedberg	qualified	it	(Friedberg	1997).	This	was	to	highlight	the	limitations	raised	by
Simon,	and	to	link	the	rationality	to	the	context	of	action.
7	This	scale	is	also	arbitrary;	but	this	is	not	an	issue,	since	results	of	analysis	and	simulation	only	make	sense	in	comparison	one	to	another
or	as	a	rate	(the	position	of	its	actual	value	within	its	range).
8	It	is	also	relevant	to	consider	the	cooperative_power	(i.e.	the	sum	of	the	positive	impacts)	and	the	uncooperative_power	(i.e.	the	sum	of	the
negative	impacts)	of	an	actor.
9	One	can	also	impose	the	constraint	Σb	∈	A 	solidarity(a,	b)	=	1	to	keep	the	same	range	of	value	for	all	actors'	satisfactions,	or	other
constraints	such	as	Σb	∈	A 	|solidarity(a,	b)|	=	1.	To	clarify	the	sociological	interpretation	of	each	case	would	require	a	long	discussion.	The
default	value	is	solidarity(a,	b)	=	1	if	a	=	b,	0	else.
10	The	default	values	are	b_minr	=	-10	and	b_maxr	=	10.
11	The	default	values	are	on_bminr,	r'(sr)	=	-10	and	on_bmaxr,	r'	(sr)	=	10.
12	This	stability	is	required	for	the	anticipation	of	others'	actions,	and	thus	for	coordination.
13(Sandri	and	Sibertin-Blanc	2007)	also	shows	how	the	rationality	of	social	actors	can	be	modeled	within	a	fuzzy	framework.
14	When	the	gap	between	the	ambition	and	the	satisfaction	of	the	agent	decreases,	the	explore/exploit	rate	moves	toward	more	exploitation,
in	order	to	improve	the	possibility	for	the	satisfaction	to	overtake	the	ambition.	This	bias	favors	the	convergence	of	simulations,	i.e.	the	fact
that	the	satisfaction	of	each	agent	becomes	greater	than	his	ambition.	This	property	of	the	algorithm	models	the	fact	that	each	actor	who	is	a
member	of	an	organization	has	some	interest	in	the	prolongation	of	his	membership,	therefore	the	prolongation	of	the	organization,	and	thus
its	regulation.
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15	Concrete	social	organizations	are	not	zero-sum	games:	the	raison	d'être	of	any	organization	is	to	improve	the	collective	capability	of	its
members.
16	Concerning	the	power	of	an	actor,	one	may	include	or	not	the	power	he	exerts	on	himself.
17	Once	again,	there	are	many	ways	to	aggregate	monadic	or	diadic	indexes,	according	to	the	conception	of	social	or	organizational	welfare
(Arrow	et	al.	2002).
18	In	case	the	convergence	states	of	simulation	runs	are	quite	dispersed,	we	will	consider	that	the	organization	is	weakly	regulated	and
seems	feature	some	anomy.	In	case	the	convergence	states	of	simulation	runs	feature	several	modes,	or	clusters	which	can	be	highlighted	be
a	Hierarchical	Ascending	Classification	or	a	Principal	Component	Analysis,	one	could	be	expected	that	one	of	these	modes	corresponds	to
the	observed	configuration,	while	the	others	are	potentialities	of	the	organization	that	are	not	actualized	but	could	become	so	(Villa-Vialaneix
et	al.	2014).
19	This	paper	is	not	the	place	to	discuss	the	concept	of	power,	which	is	the	subject	of	a	considerable	literature;	we	just	notice	that,	despite
appearances,	the	contemporary	evolution	of	the	forms	of	authority	does	not	decrease	its	important	(Courpasson	et	al.	2012).
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